Is Punishment for Subjective Disciplinary Infractions Legitimate?

• In Event: The Epistemic Subject of Educational Authority

Abstract

While no ascription of wrongdoing is free of interpretation, overreliance on discretion and lack of objective standards when ascribing wrongdoing seems inherently unacceptable. Yet subjective infractions, which are ripe for interpretive abuse, are thought to be a fitting disciplinary category in schools that merits punishment. This paper examines whether punishment for subjective infractions is legitimate despite the subjective nature of the infractions punished and the unjust outcomes that such punishment yields. It is argued that punishment for subjective infractions may be legitimate if it helps schools advance their legitimate educational and moral aims. However, the argument fails since the arbitrary nature of ascriptions of wrongdoing associated with subjective infractions undermines these aims. Punishment for subjective infractions must therefore be abandoned.

Author

• Alexandros Charalampos Nikolaidis, University of Central Florida