From Conceptualization to Casuistics: The Development of the Talmudic LAVUD

• In Event: Examining the Development of Rabbinic Law

Abstract

Historians of rabbinic halakhah have observed that tannaitic literature is usually formulated casuistically, and hence is generally devoid of explicit concepts and legal principles. Nevertheless, both the Talmuds and modern scholars have often attempted, with varying degrees of persuasiveness, to extrapolate the legal principles which, they assume, underlie the casuistically formulated tannaitic rulings.
In this paper we consider the development of one such principle, the notion that a space of less than three handbreadths is considered legally inconsequential, or “joined” (LAVUD, in the Bavli’s terminology) or “sealed” (SATUM, in the Yerushalmi’s terminology). This principle is enunciated explicitly by the amoraim, although it seems to emerge quite clearly from “between the lines” analysis of various tannaitic statements dealing with issues from diverse legal domains, such as the laws of KILAYIM, SUKKAH, and ‘ERUV. Thus, the amoraic formulation of this principle and the assumption that this notion is capable of universal application would seem to be fully justified, prima facie.
Surprisingly, however, one Bavli manuscript explicitly questions this principle, even while other manuscripts to this passage declare this notion self-evident! In this paper it is argued that the reading of the first manuscript – which one medieval commentator claims was attested by all (!) extant texts – reflects an original, and perhaps the original, rabbinic approach to the notion of LAVUD, according to which this is not a universal principle. According to this view, the casuistically formulated tannaitic sources were motivated by a variety of localized considerations, but they never adopted a universal approach regarding the legal status of less than three handbreadths. Additional support for this conception of the tannaitic halakhah may be adduced from other sources, including other Bavli dicta, a Yerushalmi sugya, and examination of relevant baraitot.
This paper accordingly demonstrates how problematic it can be to attempt to extrapolate legal principles from casuistically formulated tannaitic rulings, even where such an approach might seem self-evident. Likewise, our analysis sheds light on the fundamentally casuistic character (not just formulation!) of much tannaitic legal thought.

author

• Leib Moscovitz, Bar-Ilan University