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How are ambiguous central mandates made governable in the absence of strong formal evaluation?

Saturday, November 7, 3:30 to 5:00pm, Property: Boston Marriott Copley Place, Floor: 3rd Floor, Room: Dartmouth

Abstract

How are broad political mandates made governable when they are substantively vague, weakly funded, and not embedded in a hard evaluation regime? Existing research treats indicators primarily as tools of performance evaluation, accountability, and incentive provision. Yet in many policy domains, indicator systems are constructed, revised, and taken seriously even when they do not function as binding instruments of cadre assessment. This article addresses this puzzle through the case of China’s Common Prosperity campaign. 

We argue that, under conditions of high political salience but low programmatic specificity, indicator systems function less as evaluative devices than as administrative infrastructure. They translate ambiguous mandates into operational categories, coordinate action across departments and levels of government, and stabilize expectations about what counts as policy progress. 

Empirically, the article develops a qualitative, process-tracing analysis of Zhejiang Province—the designated Common Prosperity demonstration zone—between 2021 and 2025. Drawing on multiple versions of the provincial indicator system, policy documents, leadership speeches, and fieldwork evidence on drafting and revision processes, we trace how the system was constructed, iteratively recalibrated, and embedded into administrative routines. 

We identify three main findings. First, the indicator system’s primary function was interpretive: it rendered “common prosperity” administratively legible by specifying dimensions, targets, and measurable proxies. Second, it served a coordinative role, aligning departments and lower-level governments through a shared framework for responsibility allocation and progress reporting. Third, iterative revision was constitutive rather than corrective: changes in indicators and targets continually redefined the mandate itself by recalibrating priorities and feasible benchmarks. 

These findings challenge the view that indicators matter only through formal evaluation or symbolic compliance. We show that, in the absence of strong evaluative enforcement, indicator systems can still shape governance by structuring how ambiguous political goals are interpreted, coordinated, and enacted. More broadly, the article identifies a set of scope conditions under which this mode of governance emerges: when mandates are politically salient, substantively open-ended, cross-sectoral, and not already specified through hard performance regimes.

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