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State rainy day funds are a central tool for managing fiscal uncertainty, particularly as states face increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters. In recent years, these reserves have reached historically high levels, reflecting a stronger emphasis on fiscal preparedness. Prior research has highlighted moral hazard associated with federal disaster assistance where generous ex-post aid may discourage state and local preparedness. However, a recent federal policy change may create a distinct and previously underexamined form of moral hazard by unintentionally penalizing states that maintain higher fiscal reserves.
In 2019, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) incorporated state fiscal capacity into its evaluation criteria through the Cost-to-Capacity (ICC) ratio. This metric compares the estimated cost of disaster assistance to a state’s total taxable resources and was intended to reduce reliance on federal assistance while encouraging greater state and local responsibility. Since then, disaster declaration denials have become more prominent. For example, in 2025 alone, there were 18 denials of major disaster declarations, indicating declined access to several forms of federal assistance. Many states contested these outcomes, arguing their damages met qualifying thresholds for federal support.
The study examines whether FEMA declaration denials generate unintended or potentially perverse incentives. Specifically, it asks whether denials create a “success penalty” that may discourage states from maintaining fiscal reserves. Drawing on organizational learning theory, this study considers whether states update their fiscal strategies based on these signals, potentially learning that higher reserves may reduce their eligibility for federal assistance. This question has important implications for whether current policy design undermines or reinforces state fiscal preparedness.
To examine this question, I construct a panel dataset of 47 U.S. states from 2002 to 2024, combining data on disaster declaration requests and denial, and outcomes with fiscal indicators from the NASBO Fiscal Survey. The primary outcomes are rainy day fund balances and unassigned general fund balances, measured as a share of expenditures. I employ two complementary empirical strategies. First, to account for the dynamic nature of fiscal behavior, I estimate a dynamic panel model using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Second, to identify the causal effect of FEMA denial, I exploit the 2019 introduction of the ICC ratio as a quasi-exogenous policy shift that altered how FEMA evaluates state assistance needs. I first test whether high-capacity states experienced a relative increase in denial probability after 2019, and then use this differential exposure to identify how capacity-based denial risk affects state reserve behavior.
By linking federal disaster policy to state fiscal behavior, this study contributes to the literature on intergovernmental incentives and policy feedback. It also provides early empirical evidence on the effects of disaster declaration denials, suggesting that federal policy change may generate unintended behavioral responses that shape state-level fiscal preparedness. Understanding whether denials discourage or reinforce state fiscal preparedness is critical for evaluating the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of federal disaster programs.