Making Democracy Work: Comparative Democratization in Brazil and South Africa

Session Submission Type: Full Submitted Panel

Session Description

Much research in comparative politics has focused on democracy at the macro-institutional level. Less is known about how democracy actually works "under the hood." To begin to learn more about how democracies actually function, this panel brings together papers studying Brazil and South Africa, two young institutionalized democracies. The papers all use rigorous empirical research designs and original data sources, and provide important theoretical insights about the costs and benefits of democratic institutions. Two papers address the case of Brazil, both investigating the consequences of democratic institutions such as audits. The papers show that while audits seem to be unambiguously good, they may actually induce democratic problems. Almeida and Hidalgo show that audits reduce local accountability and authority. Similarly, Funk and Owen show that they may also induce mismanagement of public resources. As such, transparency is not free – it comes with costs for local accountability and government performance. Two papers consider South Africa, and explore how democratic structures shape specifically electoral outcomes. Berliner and Wehner show that South Africa’s audits do induce electoral accountability. De Kadt shows that expanding electoral administration has influenced the shape of the electorate, over-representing those who are already represented. Together, the conclusions of all four papers suggest that making democracy work is a difficult task that requires further attention from researchers and policy makers. Democratic transparency can have positive consequences for accountability, but may carry costs in terms of the division of power, mismanagement, and the potential for strategic manipulation. Likewise, expanding electoral administration to increase access can sometimes further the ideals of democracy, but can other times worsen inequality in the electorate. This panel seeks to provide a starting point for researchers to think more about the internal mechanics of democratic institutions, and how they further – or stymie – democratic ends.

Beyond these theoretical and empirical contributions, this panel seeks to re-invigorate the study of comparative politics by prompting discussion and collaboration across geographic boundaries. The two cases on which the papers focus -- Brazil and South Africa -- are two of the largest and most influential young democracies. This focus on comparison is reflected in our choice of discussants. Karen Ferree, who will serve as both chair and discussant, is an expert on the electoral politics of Southern Africa. Joining her will be Natalia Bueno, whose work focuses on Brazilian democracy and accountability. Together, we hope this panel inspires conversations and collaborations across sub-field boundaries.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 44: COMPARATIVE DEMOCRATIZATION

Individual Presentations

• Audits and Accountability in South Africa - Joachim Wehner, London School of Economics

• Electoral access and political inequality: Evidence from South Africa - Daniel de Kadt, UC Merced

• Consequences of an Anti-Corruption Experiment: (Mis)management in Brazil - Kendall Funk, Arizona State University; Erica Owen, Texas A&M University

• Partisan Auditors: Auditing Institutions and Enhancing Executive Power in Brazil - F. Daniel Hidalgo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chair

• Karen E. Ferree University of California, San Diego

Discussant

• Natalia Salgado Bueno Yale University