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Ideological Asymmetry in Conspiracy Beliefs: The Role of Political Loser Status

Sat, September 2, 8:00 to 9:30am, Parc 55, Davidson

Abstract

As the 2016 US presidential election demonstrated, conspiracy beliefs are undoubtedly, and increasingly, politically and socially significant. Although we know much about the psychological antecedents of conspiracy endorsement, we know less about individual-level political causes of these prevalent and consequential beliefs. Our recent work (Miller, Saunders, and Farhart 2015) found that conservatives believe conspiracy theories that impugn liberals to a greater degree than liberals believe conspiracy theories that impugn conservatives. One possible reason for the ideological asymmetry is that conservatives are higher in the existential needs for order, certainty, and control, which are correlated with conspiracy endorsement. However, given that the evidence for the ideological asymmetry is based on data collected during the Obama presidential election, there is an alternative explanation. Namely, people may be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories that make their political rivals look bad when they are on the losing side of politics (as a way to explain why they are on the losing side), regardless of ideology. In this paper, we report four tests of this hypothesis using both observational and panel data. In two MTurk surveys, we demonstrate that people who feel that they are on the losing side of politics are more likely to engage in ideologically-motivated conspiracy endorsement (by endorsing conspiracy theories that impugn their political rivals), regardless of ideology. We will also test our hypothesis using two pre/post 2016 election panel datasets (one administered by YouGov in conjunction with their CCES project and one administered by the University of Minnesota’s Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) using a sample obtained by SSI). In both panel surveys, we assessed perceptions of loser status and endorsement of specific conspiracy theories (CSPP) or conspiratorial thinking (CCES) before and after the election. The panel nature of these data will enable us to replicate our finding that, prior to the election, conservatives will be more likely to engage in ideologically-motivated conspiracy endorsement than liberals (because they were more likely to feel like political losers at that time). These data will also enable us to test whether this pattern reverses after the election of the Republican, Donald Trump, to the president. We discuss the implications of our work for theories about the dispositional and situational causes of conspiracy theory endorsement, as well as for research aimed at mitigating such effects.

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