Decongesting Africa’s Streets: Analyzing Harassment of the Urban Informal Sector

• In Event: New Explorations of Violence in Africa

Abstract

What explains differential harassment of the urban informal sector in Africa? Official definitions of the informal sector vary, but they all generally refer to a source of non-agricultural employment in which workers are not recognized or protected under labor legislation or social protection, work irregular hours in unsafe conditions in small or undefined workplaces, and often do not pay taxes. In the African context, approximately 72 percent of non-agricultural employment is concentrated in the informal economy. Street vending and informal trade are especially important sources of livelihood and financial independence for women.

Despite the importance of the sector for urban livelihoods, the attitudes and discourse of African governments vis-à-vis the informal sector has long been conflicted. On the one hand, the informal sector represents industrious micro-enterprises that could spearhead structural transformation, a source of much-needed tax revenue for local councils, and employs a sizeable share of the voting population. On the other hand, street vendors and hawkers are a nuisance for the nascent middle class and undermine African governments’ aspirations to transform the region’s cities into world class destinations. Although “decongestion” exercises and street cleaning campaigns are far less frequent today than they were in the early 1990s, informal sector workers continue to face harassment by African governments who erratically push them off streets, relocate them to undesirable market locations, extort money, and confiscate merchandise. Common justifications given for their harassment include violating property rights, tax evasion, or public safety concerns. However, the timing and geographic focus of such harassment can vary substantially.

I explore four, albeit not entirely mutually exclusive, hypotheses that may explain more systematic patterns of differential treatment of the urban informal sector across cities and across countries. First, the availability of powerful unions or vocal civic associations to lobby for informal workers’ rights may explain whether concessions are made to the sector and whether there is a viable counterpart with whom the government can bargain. Secondly, the partisan affiliation of local councils can affect the nature of relationships between the government and urban informal workers. In Africa, urbanites tend to be more likely to favor opposition parties. When there is a case of vertically-divided authority such that cities are governed by opposition parties, then episodes of violence towards the sector by national authorities may increase. Thirdly, the nature of local electoral rules can play an important role in government motivations. When mayors are elected, they are more likely to worry about offending a numerically sizable constituency, such as the informal sector. However, when they are appointed, they are less constrained by this concern and motivated more by their mandate to govern their city effectively. Fourth, the timing of elections may explain when accommodation prevails over harassment, with politicians more likely to oppose harassment if elections are closer; such restraint is a costless form of vote buying. When elections are concurrent, this pattern is more likely than when elections are not; in the latter case, either local councils or national political elites are less likely to be in sync over policy towards the sector.

To test these various hypotheses, this paper draws on an event database from 2000-2016 for Ghana, Senegal, and Zambia. The database relies on media reports of both violence to the informal sector and efforts at accommodating their demands. This allows for in-depth process tracing of the timing, location, catalyst, and main government authority across the three countries (e.g. city council, a ministry of local government, office of the president) that typically authorizes actions against informal workers.

Despite all having robust civil associations of informal workers, the three countries offer a useful context for comparison due to their variation with respect to some of the other hypotheses outline above. In Ghana, mayors are appointed by the president throughout the country and therefore, there is little option for vertically-divided authority to emerge. In both Senegal and Zambia, mayors are elected and key cities have been governed by opposition parties. However, elections are concurrent in Zambia and non-concurrent in Senegal.
Overall, the research contributes to a broader understanding of the drivers of everyday violence in Africa and its geographical manifestations. Furthermore, it emphasizes the complex dynamics of urban politics in contemporary African democracies and how the institutional contours of decentralization can have substantive implications for poor citizens in the urban milieu.

Author

• Danielle Elise Resnick, International Food Policy Research Institute