Developing a Theory of Presidential Interaction with the Courts

• In Event: Executive Branch Politics in the U.S. Federal Judiciary

Abstract

This paper examines when, and under what conditions, the president seeks to accomplish his policy goals through his interaction with the federal court system. The project offers an original theory of presidential decision making. This theory is informed by archival work done at four presidential libraries, Truman, Eisenhower, Carter, and Reagan. The archival evidence shows that the president is involved with actors in the Department of Justice, most specifically the Attorney General and Solicitor General, and provides direction on court cases of interest. I also argue that the president behaves strategically and rationally in deciding to employ tactics to influence the courts (amicus briefs, appealing, entering into cases, and offering public commentary). The president’s decision to take action, and the degree of action he takes, is a function of his level of interest or commitment in achieving policy change and the likelihood that policy change would occur without his intervention. This project therefore moves beyond simply assuming presidents want to influence the judiciary to proposing a framework for when they are mostly likely to do so, in what manner, and the potential costs that presidents must weigh in deciding whether to act.

Author

• Natalie C Rogol, Georgia State University