Political Polarization and Opposition Coordination in Egypt and Tunisia

• In Event: Finding Freedom in a Realm of Constricted Liberties and Repression

Abstract

I will take on the question of transition from authoritarianism form a comparative perspective. That is, why did transition from authoritarian regimes bring about different political trajectories in Egypt and Tunisia? I will examine the relative power of the old regime’s opponents and how the balance of elite power would create demands for democracy and affect possibilities for coordination and successful transition.

The distribution of power between opposition forces and the existence of an umpire player of the electoral game as key determinants of actors’ decisions, strategies, self-interested calculations, and incentive structures. The existence of an umpire player and actor’s choice to coalesce with it made any game of transition futile which no one can win. Opposition actors -when threatened- resort to the umpire from the old authoritarian bloc that would intervene to terminate the round of electoral game and maintain stability.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers (MB) heightened ideological polarization and created exclusionary mode of competition and sided with old power centers to buttress their power. The incentive structures in Egypt created a behavioral equilibrium where segments of opposition were better off uniting as well with the old power centers, where opponents were trapped in investing in the revival of the old autocratic game rather than sustaining rebellion against it. I will explore the mechanics of authoritarian revival by uncovering the behavioral incentives faced by the elites to coalesce or not to
coalesce with the umpire player, and the calculus of the opposition’s coordination dilemmas in competing against the old regime defenders.

In Tunisia, actors had strong incentives to make calculations anticipating the foreseeable consequences of their choices as they believed that they were not likely to have the same opportunity of regime opening to repeat the game soon thereafter. Actors transcended the religious-secular cleavages and the Troika promise of Ennahda and two secular partners, the Congrès pour le République (CPR) and Ettakatol between 2011 and 2013 was a political solution to curb ‘potential spoilers’ from destabilizing political life after the departure of the autocratic leader.

I will develop game-theoretic models of authoritarian breakdown and contingent transition trajectory in the aftermath. The analysis will be based on empirical evidence from fieldwork conducted in the two countries between August 2012 and September 2016. The empirical analysis is based on 63 semistructured interviews with party members as well as textual analysis of internal political documents of different political parties.

Author

• Shimaa Hatab, Cairo University