Bureaucratic Manoeuvres and the Local Politics of Clean Energy Innovation

• In Event: The Politics of Clean Energy Innovation

Abstract

This paper uses research on clean energy innovation in China and India to explore how government agencies seek to overcome challenges of limited capacity and competing priorities by bundling clean energy innovation together with more immediate priorities. Using the case of energy efficiency, we show how bundling strategies were used to broaden the appeal of energy efficiency measures and develop a coalition with an interest in achieving these objectives. While bundling raised the profile of energy efficiency, it also created perverse incentives that highlight the need to consider the long-term effect on the interests, capacity and sustainability of informal coalitions. Based on dozens of interviews in both China and India from 2010 till today, we present evidence that a focus on incentives may be insufficient for prioritising energy efficiency measures that deliver long term benefits. In China, the more aggressive approach appeared to deliver more initial impact but a combination of slowing economic growth and people’s ability to game the system raised questions about the long-term viability of such a complex incentive system. China’s experience suggests that informal coalitions may be effective in the short-term but are unlikely to be sustainable when things get difficult and may not prove adaptable to new challenges. We conclude that coalition formation and maintenance is not just about aligning interests but also about knowing who to approach, how to approach them and, most of all, being able to secure their trust. As a result, leaders who are well embedded in their localities or policy spheres are more likely to get things done by making context-specific policy adaptations. They are more likely to have access to professional or personal networks that can help them secure buy-in from coalition partners. The importance of these networks means effective coalitions cannot be built overnight; however, precisely because the networks are often professional, rather than purely personal, over time state policy can affect the conditions for coalition formation.

Authors

• Tom Harrison, Institute of Development Studies

• Genia Kostka, Freie Universität Berlin