International Organizations as Problem-Solvers in Global Refugee Policy

• In Event: Independence and Accountability of International Organizations

Abstract

Vast sums of money are invested annually in international organizations. Although this money is intended to help mitigate humanitarian crises, enhance global development, or help solve any of the myriad global problems the world faces today, we also know that most decisions made by international organizations---and their constituent member states---are fraught with political considerations that can significantly constrain the maneuvering space of IOs. As a result, we have limited knowledge of the extent to which IO spending actually reflects global needs or the preferences of the organization itself rather than, e.g., the salience of individual crises to certain member states. This is, in part, due to empirical difficulties: we do not directly observe the negotiations that determine IO spending. What we can observe, however, is how IO budgets---which are initially drafted by the bureaucracy and are then agreed upon by member states---evolve over time and respond to member state preferences. Focusing on the efforts of the UN system on refugee issues, we develop an original dataset on budgets, expenditures, and global refugee populations that allows us to trace the extent to which budgeting reflects shifts in refugee populations as well as the role that member state preferences have on the eventual expenditures. Thus, this paper speaks to broader questions about member-state delegation of responsibilities to IOs, the dynamics that underlie financing of IO, and why, in the face of persistent criticism for lack of effectiveness, ineffciency, and bureaucratic bloat, member states continue to fund IOs in the way that they do.

Authors

• Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir, LMU Munich

• Ronny Patz, LMU Munich

• Klaus H. Goetz, University of Munich