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Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel
Based on the recommendations of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 2013, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC)’s Anxieties of Democracy program created an initiative to support research on the processes of negotiating agreement in Congress. As the SSRC put it: “processes of negotiating agreement in Congress are under great stress, yet we know very little about the mechanics, challenges, and remedies for this problem.”
Each of the papers on this panel is supported by the Anxieties of Democracy Program. Jointly, the authors explore the incentives that members of Congress face, and the tools they have at their disposal, to engage in negotiation and compromise: either individually, or as part of caucuses and parties.
Danielle Thomsen and Logan Dancey both explore the electoral incentives faced by candidates running for Congress; in particular, they ask how the public reacts to ideologically extreme vs. moderate candidates. Danielle Thomsen asks whether primary voters become less supportive of ideologues when the actions of ideologues are explicitly connected to partisan conflict in Congress. Logan Dancey traces typical news media coverage of congressional moderates, and tests voters’ responses to such coverage. Both papers rely on survey experimental evidence.
Moving from the level of the individual congressperson to Congressional leadership, Jason Roberts and Mamie Locke explore the tools and strategies available to caucuses and parties to enact their policy agendas. Mamie Locke studies the strategies used by the Congressional Black Caucus from 2000 to the present, in an increasingly polarized Congress. Jason Roberts looks at how parties enact their policy agenda, and proposes that successful party leaders balance two incentives: working to get like-minded individuals elected and enacting policies that are consistent with their members’ preferences and the party’s name brand.
Individually, the papers on this panel vary in terms of their analytical focus: from primary and Congressional races, through the actions of Congressional caucuses, to Congressional leadership. A range of methodological approaches are represented as well: archival research, media analysis, and experimental designs. Collectively, however, they all speak to the institutional and electoral factors that shape Congress’s capacity to negotiate agreement.
Do Primary Voters Want Partisan Polarization? - Danielle Thomsen, University of California, Irvine
Caught in the Middle: Congressional Moderates in a Polarized Era - Logan Dancey, Wesleyan University
Strategies of the Congressional Black Caucus in Negotiating Agreements - Mamie E. Locke, Hampton University
Party Effectiveness in the U.S. Congress - Jason M. Roberts, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill