Disruptive Ends, Asymmetric Ways, Few Means: Russian Grand Strategy on the Cheap

• In Event: The Intersection of Great Powers and Local Populism in Eurasia

Abstract

Since the 2008 invasion of Georgia and accelerating with the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has emerged as a highly disruptive revisionist great power in Eurasia and beyond. However, I argue that Russia’s core strategic objectives have remained relatively consistent since Vladimir Putin’s ascent to the presidency in 2000: to establish a privileged Russian sphere of influence throughout the post-Soviet space as part of a “multipolar” world where great powers have a free hand to shape the foreign and domestic policies of countries within their spheres. While these strategic ends have remained constant, the ways and means by which Russia pursues them have evolved since 2000, giving rise to several distinct phases of Russian foreign and defense policy, including periods of “pragmatic accommodation” (2000-2003) and “soft balancing” (2004-2013). Since 2014 Russia’s approach can be described as “asymmetric balancing,” whereby it uses a variety of tactics – often described as “gray zone” or “hybrid” tactics to pursue its strategic ends with increasingly disruptive ways. This paper focuses on Russia’s use of information warfare in several countries, including Ukraine, the Baltic States, and the United States, to manipulate the citizens, politics, and policies of target countries. Specifically, it examines Russia’s use of information operations to support domestic and transnational populist and nationalist movements, sow civil discord, and undermine perceptions of governmental legitimacy in target countries. The appeal of such tactics is that they are a relatively “cheap” way to undermine adversaries and expand influence for revisionist powers of limited means like Russia. However, when made public such operations can provoke a counterproductive backlash, as seen in the public reaction against Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This risk of popular backlash calls into question their overall effectiveness as a means of furthering strategic interests against adversaries.

Author

• Robert Person, United States Military Academy