Rebel Fragmentation and Peace Agreement Amnesties

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security III & Migration and Citizenship
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Security III

Abstract

Why do governments grant amnesties to former rebels after civil wars? Existing arguments claim governments use amnesties during the peace process to signal a commitment to peace or prevent spoiling by rebel leaders. These arguments are incomplete. Other reforms are stronger signals of commitment than amnesties, and rebel leaders are almost never prosecuted following comprehensive peace agreements, with or without amnesty. Instead, I argue that amnesties protect rank and file rebels from post-war prosecution. When there are multiple competing rebel groups, rebel foot soldiers can use the threat of exit to force their leaders to negotiate amnesties. Using data on peace agreement provisions and implementation, as well as a new measure of rebel group similarity, I show that governments are more likely to grant amnesties when faced with multiple rebel groups that are close substitutes. In addition, implementing amnesties prevents renewed war when there are substitute groups, but does nothing without them.

Author

• Matthew Hauenstein, University of Notre Dame