Signaling Capacity and Crisis Bargaining in Northeast Asia

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security III & Migration and Citizenship
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Security III

Abstract

International crises are instances of competitive risk taking wherein escalation serves as an important mechanism by which actors test the resolve and assess the military capabilities of their opponents. According to the crisis bargaining literature, minimal escalatory moves serve a key information-providing function. With increased clarity among all actors about the actual balance of resolve and capabilities, iterative steps up the ladder of escalation may thus result in greater stability between the rivals over the longer term. Not all crises, however, display this type of micro-level instability, but macro-level stability. Much depends on the ability of the actors to: 1) execute discrete, minimal escalatory moves with their military forces, 2) coordinate military and diplomatic activities to ensure consistency in the signals sent to the rival, and 3) accurately interpret the information revealed throughout the crisis pertaining to the opponent’s resolve and military capabilities. This paper argues that a state’s “signaling capacity” exerts powerful effects on crisis dynamics and outcomes. Signaling capacity is a composite concept of three distinct elements: 1) the diversification of intelligence portfolios, 2) the flexibility of military missions entailed in a state’s military doctrine, and 3) the coordination of military and diplomatic activities. This paper argues that states with high signaling capacity are likely to fare better strategically in international crises than are states with low signaling capacity. This paper demonstrates the conceptual utility of signaling capacity in a stylized conflict scenario between the United States and China occasioned by dramatically rising tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. This purpose of the scenario is to demonstrate, first, why the U.S. will need to combine increasingly escalatory military threats to North Korea with credible signals of reassurance to China. While U.S. aims in the Korean contingency would be limited at the start, the means by which those aims are achieved would necessarily threaten Chinese security. Second, by considering multiple targets, this scenario systematically highlights the signaling capacity requirements for success in crisis bargaining: diversified intelligence portfolios, flexibility in military missions, and tight military-diplomatic coordination. Finally, the paper argues that American signaling capacity in the Trump administration is low due to interagency dysfunction, poor civil-intelligence relations, and doctrinal rigidity under conditions of AirSea Battle doctrine.

Author

• Spencer D. Bakich, Virginia Military Institute