Tangled! Congolese Provincial Elites in a Web of Patronage

• In Event: Corruption and Elite Capture in Sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract

Expectations that decentralisation in DRC would result in improved provincial governance were predicated upon an understanding of provincial elites as autonomous from Kinshasa. In reality, they are deeply embedded in informal patronage networks that reach out across the country, emanating from the presidency outwards. These networks are highly centralised, weaving a web that largely neutralises the political, financial and administrative autonomy of provinces. Features of this web include: (1) the informal control of political and administrative appointments, that should be provincially allocated, by elites in and around the presidency; (2) financial poaching of provincial actors; (3) predatory extractive pressures by central elites; (4) the use of political ‘godfathers’ to maintain indirect oversight of provincial elites; (5) the use of provincial legislative authorities as tools for sanctioning unreliable governors. Under these conditions, effective decentralisation remains elusive. For possibly better odds of success, donors could consider interventions that seek to build on the existing patronage structure rather than seeking to eliminate or ignoring it. Our findings are based on fieldwork carried out over 2017–2018 in three of the four provinces of former Katanga: Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami and Lualaba. We interviewed about 80 respondents, including provincial political actors, civil servants, civil society activists, ethnic representatives and academics. We also gathered data on budgets, transfers and employment from provincial executives and assemblies.

Authors

• Lisa Jené, Claremont Graduate University

• Pierre Englebert, Pomona College