Weakening Autocracy: Internal and External Opposition Forces in Dictatorships

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Recent scholarship on democratization focuses on how structural and institutional factors affect the propensity of autocratic breakdown. The lack of economic growth or the organization of social opposition are key explanatory variables from the structural perspective, while the institutional approach views characteristics of the authoritarian regime itself as crucial in explaining autocratic collapse. However, the literature still does not provide a clear assessment of the causal mechanisms linked with these macro-level factors. Unpacking causal mechanisms is critical for causal inference. To fill this gap in the literature, a series of papers examines a well-known mechanism in the democratization literature: the formation of political opposition against the authoritarian rule – within and outside the ruler’s coalition. Specifically, the papers develop and test theories of how structural changes affect the strategies taken by key actors – the ruler’s allies, opposition and citizens – to either support or rebel against the regime.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 44: Comparative Democratization

Individual Presentations

• Exploring Strategic Coalitions among Heterogenous Regime Elites - Allison Cuttner, Emory University

• Office Insecurity and Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies - Adrian del Rio, European University Institute

• Learning to Build Opposition Alliances in Electoral Autocracies - Jiayun Elvin Ong, University of British Columbia

• Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support: Survey Evidence from Russia - David Szakonyi, Higher School of Economics

Chair

• Adrian del Rio European University Institute

Discussants

• Carl Henrik Knutsen Department of Political Science, University of Oslo

• Masaaki Higashijima Tohoku University