Regime Type, Leadership, and PMSC Employment in Civil Wars and Weak States

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security III & Migration and Citizenship
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Security III

Abstract

In an increasingly populist world where unique diplomatic and security arrangements develop, the private sector increasingly delivers state security functions. This manuscript examines when and why states decide to employ private military and security companies (PMSCs). We argue that regime type and leader characteristics affect the probability of employing firms. Differences in regime type’s control of power and implementation of security policy helps explain variation in hiring practices. Dominate party regimes are more likely to hire PMSCs because centralized authority within the party enables contract management while the party organization generates institutional control to limit potential liabilities associated with outsourcing security and military capabilities. Personalist regimes are less likely to hire PMSCs because of the regime leader’s pre-existing control over the state’s security apparatus. The introduction of non-state-based security providers undermines personalist regimes. Military regimes are likely to employ PMSCs only when the leader was previously a rebel commander. We argue that leadership experience and the bureaucratic responsibilities of organizing and running a campaign, not simply being in the military, better positions certain leaders to take on the bureaucratic challenge of hiring PMSCs. In the absence of specific leadership experience, military regimes, similar to personalist regimes, are unlikely to contract security services. Democracies, led by the US are the largest employer of PMSCs, but research has yet to account for variation in hiring practices amongst democratic regimes. We argue that democratic regimes are less likely to employ PMSCs if the democracy is institutionally weak or transitioning because these regimes lack the bureaucratic capacity to hire and manage firms. We empirically investigate our expectations using two samples, African states that faced civil wars between 1990-2008 and a global sample of weak states during the same period. We find empirical support for our hypotheses: regime type affects the likelihood states utilize PMSCs. Additionally, we find that leader experience as a rebel commander does increase the likelihood of PMSC employment by military regimes. The implications from this research are far reaching. In a changing world, where US leadership is increasingly skeptical of international engagement, states may seek alternative avenues including the private sector to ensure security.

Author

• Benjamin Tkach, Mississippi State University