Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Personal Schedule
Sign In
One modern and prevalent understanding of “the people” derives from the Rousseauean concept of the General Will, which holds that underneath a people’s apparent and often self-defeating will is a true and unified will. Rousseau conceives of a dichotomy between the General Will, which is universal and infallible, and the will of all, which is merely the aggregate of interests of the population. A perceived dichotomy between the people’s best interest and its apparent or expressed interests informs a contemporary notion of “populism” that has been widely invoked.
Democracy, according to this understanding, is not simply rule by the people but is a universal law of history that, perhaps paradoxically, may become manifest through expertly devised social and political architectonics. This philosophy of history is not so different from that of communism and may appropriately be termed “democratism” for its ideological structure and beliefs. If there is in fact a strong kinship between this modern and widely held understanding of democracy and the political ideology of communism, as I contend, it suggests that democratism is not only decidedly undemocratic but also prone to the elitism, violence, and centralization of power that characterize communist rule of the 20th century.
In order to demonstrate the ideological similarity between democratism and communism, I compare the Soviet treatment of women in Central Asia in the 20th century to the neoconservative treatment of women in Central Asia in the 21st century. Each regime sought to undermine and replace traditional Islamic society with its own vision of brotherhood and equality, a vision that each imagined to be the telos of history but requiring acceleration by force. In order to aid the historical process, both the Soviets and the neoconservatives believed that traditional society must be transformed from its backward ways to the new, progressive order. The first step was to remove women from their traditional roles, to “liberate” them. The Soviet reputation for progressive beliefs vis-à-vis women is still maintained today. This paper, however, argues that the Kremlin’s and Washington’s treatment of Muslim women in the region, although invariably cloaked in progressive language of “women’s emancipation,” was subordinated to the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the Bolshevik and neoconservative parties, respectively, and attempts to liberate women from the confines of traditional society served primarily the cause of revolutionary power and politics.
Because both the communist and democratist visions of politics are premised on a philosophy of history that ascribes to a people, and ultimately to all people of the globe, a perfect, universal will, practical actions taken in pursuit of that ideal are doomed to fail. Muslim women in Central Asia, rather than benefitting from “liberation” suffered for it. Yet rarely do scholars or the media scrutinize the liberators’ actions and motives toward these women. All too easily the failed attempts to “liberate” them are blamed on a backward and recalcitrant society. This paper reexamines those assumptions and subjects Bolshevik and neoconservative actions toward women in Central Asia to careful analysis.