What Happens When Regime Divides Fade? Evidence from Latin America

• In Event: Comparative Latin American Politics: Short-term Dynamics and Long-term Processes

Abstract

The military dictatorships of the 1960 and 1970s in Latin America have left lasting imprints on the region’s party systems. Giving rise to what have been termed authoritarian successor parties on the right and strengthening pro-democratic parties on the left, the period of military rule has resulted in powerful regime divides. In Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil, regime divides were particularly important in anchoring party systems in the populace after re-democratization. But what happens as regime divides fade over time? I argue that two factors are particularly important in determining whether party systems remain responsive to voter preferences or become uprooted in this situation: First, the extent to which the regime and economic divides cross-cut or reinforce one another; and second, the extent to which parties offer meaningful differences along the economic state-market divide.

Three scenarios result from the interaction of these factors. In a first scenario, the regime and economic divides overlap to such an extent that the fading of the former does not affect the responsiveness of a party system. Empirically, this scenario is borne out in Uruguay. When the two competitive divides cross-cut each other more strongly, on the other hand, the fading of regime divides is potentially more disruptive. In the second scenario, the economic state-market cleavage is reinvigorated as the salience of divisions over regime recedes. This evolution is bore out in the case of Chile, partially contradicting research arguing that the Chilean party system has lost touch with the electorate. In the third scenario, the lack of strong programmatic differentiation renders alignments along the economic dimension fragile. Because this makes political competition center strongly on valence competition and non-ideological factors, it has the capacity to uproot party systems, as witnessed in Brazil.

To measure party system responsiveness, I combine elite data from the Salamanca Parliamentary Elites Surveys (PELA) and the Brazilian Legislative Surveys with mass-level data from the World Values Survey (WVS), the Latinobarómetro, and the Brazilian Election Survey (ESEB). In a first step, I locate parties and voters on the economic state-market and regime divides. Drawing on multiple issue items in the elite and mass surveys, I measure latent dimensions that can be compared between the party and voter levels. The second step involves an innovative measure to assess party system responsiveness based on how well individuals’ preferences match the policy position of their preferred party.

This paper speaks to the debate on the nature and impact of regime divides for party system stability and responsiveness. It also addresses the lively debate on the resilience of the Chilean party system, and contributes to an explanation for the dramatic weakening of the party system in Brazil and the rise of a challenger from without.

Author

• Simon C. J. Bornschier, University of Zurich