Behavioral and Policy Outcomes under Free List Proportional Representation

• In Event: Using Free List Proportional Representation to Examine Political Behavior

Abstract

Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) refers to a class of electoral systems in which voters may cast one or more preference votes for individual candidates within a political party's list. Free-List Proportional Representation (FLPR) introduces a novelty to OLPR: the ability to cast preference votes for candidates of more than one party-list. This ability to 'mix' preference votes across parties provides voters and candidates incentives which differ from those of traditional OLPR systems, as well as from systems which used closed electoral lists (CLPR). This paper develops a game theoretic framework for modeling voter choice and candidate behavior in FLPR systems. It then tests a preliminary set of district- and party-level hypotheses with data from Swiss Parliamentary elections, which have used FLPR for nearly a century.

Authors

• Daniel Max Kselman, IE University

• Thomas Mustillo, University of Notre Dame

• John Polga-Hecimovich, U.S. Naval Academy