Doing Just Enough? Military Intervention and Counterinsurgency by African States

• In Event: Proxy and Irregular Warfare

Abstract

Since 2001, military intervention has been frequent in Africa. While much attention has been paid to international and non-African states, such as the United Nations, France, the UK, and US, most of the interventions have been undertaken by African actors. Regional organizations including ECOWAS and CEMAC and individual countries including Chad, Cameroon, Uganda, Rwanda, and Nigeria have conducted operations on others’ territories. Many of these interventions, whether ostensibly peacekeeping operations or efforts to destroy organizations’ sanctuaries, have targeted insurgent groups, effectively undertaking counterinsurgency operations. These operations have varied from long-term deployments as by Kenyan forces in Somalia to quick, cross-border strikes as by Rwanda in 2004 into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While there has been little discussion of these counterinsurgent efforts, what there has been has been largely critical: too much focus on military force and too little on good governance. Indeed, the operations seem unsuccessful in the sense that many of the insurgencies, most notably those by Boko Haram, al Shabaab, and other Islamist groups, continue.

That African-led counterinsurgencies are conducted far more as hit-and-run or search-and-destroy campaigns than ones designed to build legitimacy is hardly surprising. A counterinsurgency approach focused on enhancing infrastructure and good governance is expensive in terms of both money and manpower. The African countries engaging in operations are often hampered by weak finances, poor troop training and discipline, and domestic concerns about the role of militaries in political and economic realms. Furthermore, the very nature of foreign intervention makes quelling insurgency even more difficult. There is the potential for insurgent groups to exhaust the interveners, leading to their departure. Cultural differences, the perception of outside forces as occupiers, and a general lack of legitimacy limits the effectiveness of even the best equipped and funded troops.

Yet, despite the persistence of these insurgencies, the number of battle-deaths, according to a 2018 study from PRIO, has dropped, hinting at a decrease in intensity of the conflicts. Additionally, such insurgent groups, while threatening civilians locally, appear to present limited challenge to the central governments. This suggests that, while counterinsurgent efforts are not solving the conflicts, they are reducing their effects, perhaps by weakening or splitting rebel groups.

This paper engages in a qualitative examination of post-2001 African counterinsurgent approaches to explore both their level of success and the source of that effect. It draws on a variety of literatures, including debates over the success of hearts-and-minds vs. draining-the-sea campaigns in counterinsurgency, discussions of the effects of rebel factionalization in civil wars, and peacekeeping literature on the advantages and disadvantages of regional vs. international organizations. It asks, given the shortcomings of African states’ militaries and finances, whether their counterinsurgent campaigns constitute doing “just enough” to limit insurgent threats.

Author

• Andrea M. Lopez, Susquehanna University