Office Insecurity and Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies

• In Event: Weakening Autocracy: Internal and External Opposition Forces in Dictatorships

Abstract

In dictatorships, the withdrawals of political elites from the ruling coalition constitute defining moments in the regime’s life; exposing regime vulnerabilities, emboldening opposition or leading the regime towards liberal or illiberal changes. However, less is known about the factors that encourage these defections. This paper develops and tests a theory of the determinants of elite defections; using a novel dataset on the political careers of 15019 legislative deputies and government ministers in 12 electoral autocracies. The theory predicts that co-governing elites tend to defect when they anticipate that the ruler is incapable of distributing state resources to co-governing elites and apply repression. Furthermore, the increasing viability of opposition groups encourages more defections. Quantitative cross-national analysis and a case study of individual defections in Yeltsin’s Russia provide evidence of these predictions.

Author

• Adrian del Rio, European University Institute