Peer Perception by Politicians: Ultimatum Game Experiments with Legislators

• In Event: Understanding Elites Views and Behaviors

Abstract

Elected politicians constantly engage their peers, and must make judgments about their interests and predicted behaviours. How representatives judge their colleagues bears directly on their electoral fortunes, their legislative success, and a host of other politically-critical outcomes. Yet we have almost no valid evidence on the nature of those judgments. Do politicians think of their peers as more or less trustworthy, sophisticated and fair? Do they make different assumptions when bargaining with colleagues relative to interactions with non-politicians? In this study, we report results from a first of its kind experiment with close to one thousand incumbent politicians in Belgium and the United States who participated in a modified ultimatum game, in which they were randomly paired with co-partisan and out-partisan politicians and citizens. We find that politicians make substantially and significantly less generous offers to peers relative to citizens, but that at the same time, they also make significantly higher demands when faced with offers made by fellow politicians. Politicians also strongly disfavour out-partisan colleagues, and this partisan bias when interacting with peers is double the size of that expressed when they are faced with citizens. We discuss these findings and their implications in light of existing theories on legislative behaviour and elite negotiations.

Authors

• Lior Sheffer, Tel Aviv University

• Peter John Loewen, University of Toronto