The King Can Do No Wrong: Delegation and Blame Avoidance in Jordan

• In Event: Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Can autocrats avoid blame by delegating control over policy making to subordinate institutions, or do autocrats' dominant political positions make it difficult for them to deflect the public's attributions of responsibility for negative outcomes? I evaluate this question with a case study of Jordan, whose kings have often sought to minimize blame directed at the monarchy by delegating to a cabinet and parliament. Historical materials from the National Archives of the United Kingdom, more than 100 elite interviews, public opinion surveys, and a novel Facebook experiment all provide evidence indicating that Jordan's kings have been effective at protecting themselves from blame when they cede greater control over the design and implementation of policies to these other institutions. The findings illustrate how powerful autocrats can deflect public dissatisfaction and maintain popular support, even during extended periods of poor performance by their regimes.

Author

• Scott Williamson, Stanford University