Law and Order: How Legalized Opposition Impacts Crisis Behavior

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security I

Abstract

When does opposition from international organizations constrain a leader’s behavior during a military crisis? Existing studies find that international organization opposition can reduce the likelihood of crisis escalation by influencing a leader’s domestic public. Opposition, however, is often assumed to be the same. Studies from human rights literature find that international law is an effective tool to impact leader behavior, yet existing studies have not applied this logic to study leader behavior in crisis situations. This article focuses on qualitative differences in opposition from international organizations that are likely to impact a leader’s domestic public differently. It distinguishes between opposition that invokes international law (legalized) and does not invoke the law (non-legal). When an international organization invokes international law to express opposition, a leader faces greater pressure from her domestic public and also believes that the international organization will punish escalatory behavior. I use an originally coded variable on legalized opposition to test a theoretically driven hypothesis with crises from 1946 to 2015. I find that legalized opposition is less likely to lead to escalatory behavior compared to non-legal opposition. This effect is greater for domestically accountable leaders. This article applies a logic of legal pressure found in human rights literature to the study of international security and broadens our insight into when international organizations can constrain leader behavior.

Author

• Hyunki Kim, University of Maryland