School for Scandal: Why democratic processes fail to reveal education corruption

• In Event: Poster Session: Public Administration & Law and Courts
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: New Research on Public Performance and Management

Abstract

I employ a literature review and participant observation in traditional public schools and charter schools in 14 states to categorize individual and systemic school corruption, which tends to advantage elites. Second, I discuss structural factors common to school systems and charter schools explaining why despite legal requirements, school boards, administrators, and local elites often mask corrupt behavior. Finally, I recommend means of increasing integrity.
Not all forms of corruption are illegal, but all detract from the stated missions of public schooling. Examples include providing jobs or contracts based on relationships or exchange rather than merit; sexually, racially or otherwise differentially treating subordinates or parents; allowing personal relationships or gifts to influence grades, awards, selection into special programs (or into charter schools) and like decisions; directly misappropriated resources to benefit oneself or associates; manipulating measures like test scores, and masking such activities. The latter often occur when schools continue to employ corrupt officials, or allow them to resign quietly and find jobs in other schools (Author reference 2018; Segal 2004).
Education scholars largely avoid studying corruption. We searched for the keywords corruption, scandal, and ethics in articles in 16 leading scholarly journals (AERA journals and educational leadership journals with above 1.0 impact factors) for 2000-2017, finding only 26 examples. Stotsky (2015) argues that social scientists studying schools avoid research uncomfortable to those institutions.
In theory, public school systems operate democratically. In practice, pluralistic and elitist models better explain school governance, for reasons including noncompetitive and low-information school board elections, limited representation, nontransparent processes and language which disempower non-elites, limited media coverage, as well as implied (and actual) reprisals against parents and teachers who raise concerns (Howell 2005; Maeroff 2010; Williams 2005). Further, Tiebout competition discourages educators and parents from reporting activities that could bring bad publicity. Those so doing risk charges of disloyalty to the community.
School administrators manage required school board training, and discourage board members from seeking input from outside administration. Moreover, both traditional sexism (against teacher input) and hierarchical administrative ideologies discourage open processes, masking corruption (Author reference; Rousemaniere 2013). Again, those reporting perceived corruption may face sanctions as “disloyal.”
Charter schools and private schools suffer similar failings, though competitive education markets may limit corruption by enabling parents to exit corrupt schools. The smaller size and generally lower funding of private and charter schools may also limit corruption. Yet small size may also enable charismatic leadership, facilitating corruption. Further, market competition faced by charter and private schools provides even more powerful incentives than Tiebout choice to sanction parents and teachers bringing unfavorable publicity by reporting misbehavior, as recent Catholic school scandals suggest. Generally, it is unclear whether schools of choice or traditional public schools are more apt to mask corruption.
Reducing education corruption requires limiting centralized power, and better educating school leadership:
1. State school board associations should divorce their mandatory training from control by school administrators, to gain the expertise to hold officials accountable.
2. State school board associations and state education authorities should develop legal and fiscal outreach capacities enabling board members to seek information from sources other than superintendents, particularly as regards audits.
3. School board elections should occur on general election dates, to increase transparency and turnout (Howell 2005).
4. Educational leadership programs and administrator associations should train future leaders regarding corruption. This is not usually the case (Hess 2013).
5. Extending school choice could enable parents and teachers to exit corrupt schools.
References
Hess, F.M. (2013). Cagebusting leadership. Cambridge: Harvard Education Press.
Howell, W.G. ed. (2005). Besieged: School boards and the future of education politics. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Maeroff, G. I. (2010). School boards in America: A flawed exercise in democracy. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Rousmaniere, K. (2013). The principal's office: A social history of the American school principal. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Segal, L.G. (2004). Battling Corruption in America’s Public Schools. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Stotsky, S.S. (2015). An Empty Curriculum: The Need to Reform Teacher Licensing Regulations and Tests. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Williams, J. (2005). Cheating Our Kids. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.

Author

• Robert Maranto, University of Arkansas