No Need for Democracy: Inter-elite Conflict and Independence in the Andes

• In Event: Democracy and Revolution in Historical Perspective

Abstract

This papers asks why changes in political institutions do not necessarily lead to changes in economic institutions. In particular, this paper addresses why the rupture with colonial power did not bring more inclusive economic institutions to new republics. To address this question, this paper focuses on the independence from Spanish rule of the Andean countries, using a game-theoretic approach. This paper shows the conditions that sustained colonial equilibrium and the changes that led to independence. In particular, it shows how, in a society composed by two elites and a non-elite, the conflict between elites leads to: 1) confrontation, and 2) limited voting rights and persistence of extractive economic institutions. Two elements prevent the accommodation between the elites: their similar strength, and the incapacity of the political elite to coalesce with the non-elite. The ability of the economic elite to attract the non-elite to the independence militia provided a credible mechanism to redistribute wealth and political power; with this mechanism, an extension of the franchise - democracy - was not needed. These results contribute to the literature on the persistence of economic institutions, the conditions for the extension of voting rights, and on the independence of the Andean region.

Author

• Raul Aldaz, Queen Mary University of London