Exogenous Economic Conditions and the Survival of Governments in Latin America

• In Event: Economic and Political Performance in Developing Democracies

Abstract

Many developing countries and a large subset of Latin American countries export commodities and/or import capital, which makes them particularly vulnerable to economic factors that are not under the control of governments. Previous work has argued that even where and when this is true, voters attribute economic performance to incumbents and end up punishing them for exogenous factors. In this paper we examine whether these same exogenous factors are associated with "irregular handovers of power", defined as unscheduled terminations of governments. We find that as with reelections and popularity in democratic periods, international commodity prices and international interest rates strongly predict irregular handovers in Latin America since 1960, both in autocratic and democratic periods.

Authors

• Cesar Zucco, Getulio Vargas Foundation

• Daniela Campello, Getulio Vargas Foundation