Economic Sanctions and the UN Security Council

• In Event: Strategic Decisions on Economic Sanctions

Abstract

When do the permanent members use the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose economic sanctions, and when do they act outside of the Council? Strong states have a broader range of options for taking international actions that offer both greater flexibility and control, but working through international organizations lends such action a greater measure of legitimacy. Thompson (2009) explores when powerful states opt to channel their foreign policies through international organizations versus taking unilateral action in light of this trade-off between control and legitimacy. In this paper, we apply his arguments on venue-shopping to the decision to apply sanctions, empirically testing them using newly collected data on Council behavior as well as existing data on sanctions imposition. The possibility of venue-shopping influences bargaining and behavior within the Council. If agreement cannot be reached among the permanent members, the P5 may choose to use regional organizations like NATO or the OAS to impose sanctions or to impose alone. Because of the place that sanctions occupy in foreign policy as a moderate form of coercion, more than diplomatic actions but less then military intervention, this is an interesting testing ground for the idea of venue-shopping. Negotiations over sanctions are complex and multi-dimensional within the Council as members attempt to feel out each other's preferences and likely outside options. Understanding this decision-making process is particularly interesting with regards to the United States, both a permanent member of the Security Council and the world's most prolific sanctioner.

Authors

• Susan H. Allen, University of Mississippi

• Amy Yuen, Middlebury College