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As China struggles to regulate polluters, scholars increasingly pin their hopes on environmental activists. Theoretically, this activism puts a ‘bottom-up pressure’ on local officials to punish polluters. The threat of pollution-driven unrest—which can destroy political careers—also checks the developmental ambitions of local leaders, forcing them to invest in protecting the environment. However, few studies have examined this bottom up pressure from the state’s perspective, and how different levels of the state contend with direct challenges from citizens.
Focusing on a case of prolonged pollution protest, this study examines how mid-level bureaucrats collectively manage environmental activism. Drawing evidence from interviews with the provincial, municipal and county officials challenged by activists, this paper highlights the importance of bureaucratic discretion—buttressed by a system of top-down, authoritarian governance—in containing the impact of bottom-up pressure.
Activism, especially open unrest, may lead to short-term, localised improvements in enforcement outcomes. However the power to improve long-term outcomes rests primarily in the hands of higher-level officials—who are quite effective at insulating themselves from bottom-up pressure. This finding is supported by quantitative data demonstrating that citizen complaints are only associated with improved enforcement outcomes when provincial governments are under unusually strong pressure from Beijing to clean up the environment. This paper therefore questions how far China’s growing environmental activism can keep unregulated pollution in check.