Serfs and Allies: The Consequences of Elite Collective Action in Autocracies

• In Event: Democratic Backsliding and Authoritarian Control

Abstract

Dictators cannot rule alone. Instead, they most share their power with elites that help them run the state and maintain political control. Past research has shown that the extent to which dictators share power shapes many aspects of autocratic politics. I argue that that the question of how power is shared is just as important. Sharing a set amount of power with a few political actors has different implications from sharing it with many. The power of dictators is effectively counterbalanced when they share power narrowly, with relatively few actors. By contrast, a dictator who shares power with numerous actors is better-insulated simply because a larger group is likely to have difficulty coordinating. I develop a novel measure of the collective action potential of autocratic elites using an item-response model. I find that coordinated elites may make dictatorships less tyrannical, but they also appear to diminish the dictator’s ability to make concessions to advocates of democracy.

Author

• Jose Kaire, University of Minnesota