Shadow Rapporteur Assignment in the EP: Relational and Strategic Considerations

• In Event: The Legislative Process in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

This paper examines the selection process for so-called shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP), who work alongside the lead rapporteur in charge of drafting the official committee report on a piece of proposed legislation. It asks when and how parties choose to assign shadows who both monitor and collaborate rapporteurs, paying particular attention to relational considerations: how do the individual-level attributes of the member selected as rapporteur affect who is subsequently selected as shadow? We rely on complete data on rapporteurships and shadow rapporteurships from the EP’s 7th legislative term (2009-14) to “match” pairs of rapporteurs and shadows for individual legislative proposals and across dossiers, which sheds important light on the make-up of the negotiating teams that dominate the policy-making process inside the EP and serve as lead negotiators in inter-institutional bargaining with the Council of Ministers. We also rely on a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with MEPs and party group officials to investigate the shadow rapporteur selection process, rather than just its outcomes. Preliminary findings suggest that parties seek to match experienced rapporteurs with strong shadows, that they consider the lead rapporteur’s national affiliation and ideological leanings when selecting shadows, and that a history of successful previous collaboration guides the assignment of shadows.

Authors

• Nils Ringe, University of Wisconsin, Madison

• Frank Haege, University of Limerick