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The expansion of central bank powers to include financial stability and unconventional monetary policy after the 2008 global financial crisis provoked a political backlash against central banks. Politicians have questioned the value of central bank independence and new powers and responsibilities of monetary authorities. This paper examines the effects of political commentaries over the monetary policy of the Bank of England on expectations of financial markets. In other words, I explore whether financial markets believe that monetary policy decisions of the Bank of England are influenced by pressures from policymakers. If financial markets believe that the central bank’s policy can be influenced by politicians, then political commentaries can affect market expectations. I develop an original database containing statements of British politicians about the monetary policy of the Bank of England between 1997, when it was given operational independence over monetary policy by the Labour government, and 2017. These are statements by politicians extracted from newspaper articles and newswire reports commenting on the Bank of England’s interest rate that are categorized as political pressures for monetary easing or tightening. This database will enable me to construct an indicator of political pressures on the Bank of England’s monetary policy. I will examine the impact of political commentaries on high-frequency financial market data: overnight index swap (a daily measure of market participants’ expected interest rate) and government bond yields. I will also explore whether comments by politicians on exchange rate influence the volatility of the pound-dollar exchange rate. This paper sheds new light on the question of central bank independence.