Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Personal Schedule
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Recent scholarship has argued that the "war made the state and the state made war'" paradigm has little to say about Latin America. According to this view, wars were not intense, nor were they sustained through taxation, so the origins of the state must be found elsewhere. Yet, states at the top of Latin America's hierarchy of state capacity waged and won the most intense amongst these wars. I propose the paradigm works if restated as "victory made the state, and the state made victory.'' In this article I exploit a considerable element of chance leading to particular war outcomes to identify the causal effect of losing a war. To do so I apply difference-in-differences analysis and synthetic control method to a panel of Latin America at the height of state formation (1865-1914). I find that defeat in international war had a considerable negative effect on different dimensions of state capacity, which diluted the overall state-making effects of war in this region. This suggests the need to reinterpret the findings of the bellocentrist approach in competitive environments like Europe where most losers died, introducing selection bias.