Group Selection and Opportunities for Diversity in the Judiciary

• In Event: Gender and Diversity in Judicial Politics

Abstract

In the legislative context, there is a persistent empirical relationship between party list proportional electoral systems and higher levels of gender diversity in office. I apply two mechanisms that link party-list PR systems to gender diversity in legislatures to the context of judicial selection. I hypothesize that selecting judges in groups (or pairs) rather than on a rolling, one-by-one basis should facilitate gender diversity by providing more information to respondents and by encouraging respondents to asses candidates as a “balanced” group rather than individually. Evidence from a survey experiment supports the idea that group selection facilitates gender diversity. Respondents are more critical of – indeed, they are more likely to even notice – gender disparity in judicial selection when judges are selected as a group rather than on a rolling, one-by-one basis. Observational evidence is less conclusive. Using a matching design for casual inference, I find a positive but statistically insignificant effect of group selection on the timing of gender diversification cross-nationally. I note, however, that the analysis presented here is conservative: the role of institutions in shaping opportunities for gender diversity depends on the social context. In settings where communities do not expect or even want women serving on constitutional courts, there should be little effect of institutions. By including all countries that have experienced the theoretically relevant institutional changes (and for which I have data), I necessarily underestimate the effects. By applying the logic of gender diversification in legislatures to the judiciary, this project expands our understanding of how institutions can – and do -- shape prospects for diversity across contexts and, in particular, in the judiciary.

Author

• Nancy Bays Arrington, California Polytechnic State University