It Takes a Village to Raise a Dictator: International Politics and Coup Outcomes

• In Event: Regime Change in the Shadow of Coups

Abstract

While staging a successful coup is difficult, it is perhaps the easiest step in a junta’s efforts to reach its longer-term goals. Because coups are inherently illegal and often illegitimate, coup-born regimes find themselves in perilous situations immediately following their rise to power. Resistance from civil society and international actors is commonplace. Likewise, juntas must bargain with military leaders who were left out of the coup altogether, which is a division that always arises in the post-coup environment due to the need to keep the coup plot secret. Our primary focus is on the political trajectory taken by the junta in the shadow of potential counter-coups. We argue that post-coup signals from external actors influence this decision in vital ways. Post-coup support from external democratic actors will bestow legitimacy and logistical support upon democratic-leaning juntas, allowing them to follow a democratic process. However, given the need to secure external support to assure survival, even democratic-leaning juntas will follow the authoritarian path when faced with strong condemnation by external democratic actors. Similarly, juntas that prefer to consolidate power are apt to shift towards the democratic process when supported by external democratic actors due to the enhanced support that democracies can provide, including credible security guarantees and valuable trading partnerships. When authoritarian-leaning juntas are rejected by external democratic actors, however, authoritarianism is all but inevitable. We expect these relationships to be strongest when external actors have both the power and wealth to follow through with their signals. Our empirical tests consider how responses from external actors towards coups influence a coup-born regime’s decisions to either yield power to democracy or solidify authoritarianism. Preliminary results suggest that signals from external actors are indeed consequential to determining the path taken by coup-born regimes.

Author

• Clayton L. Thyne, University of Kentucky