Biased Bases: Host Government Influence on Subnational Peacekeeper Deployment

• In Event: Statebuilding

Abstract

Where do United Nations peacekeepers deploy subnationally, and what factors influence this choice? This paper argues that due to the UN’s need to maintain governmental consent, the preferences of host governments play an important role in determining the subnational location of peacekeeper bases. In civil conflicts, because the consent of the host state takes precedence over that of non-state actors, government influence is magnified. Thus, peacekeeper base locations are, in part, a result of the strategic considerations of the governments hosting them and can have important implications for the UN’s ability to deter conflict and human rights violations by the government. This paper first presents a theory of host government preferences regarding peacekeeper deployment. From there, it develops predictions regarding the subnational location of peacekeeper bases. These predictions are then empirically tested with original data on subnational peacekeeper base location and type in African civil conflicts from 2000-2015. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of peacekeeper base location on the UN’s goals of neutrality and the protection of civilians.

Author

• Danielle Villa, Emory University