Revising the Deal: Corporate Power and the U.S.-Saudi Security Partnership

• In Event: Law, Power, and Governance of the International

Abstract

When does a corporation have power over national security policy? And how do they deploy that power to shape decision-making in international disputes? Traditionally, scholars of international security have emphasized structural variables and electoral politics, particularly campaign contributions, lobbying, and public support, as key factors influencing national security policy in democracies. This paper argues that the access provided by personal ties to key decision-makers gives some (but not all) multinational corporations a direct and often-overlooked influence over national security decision-making. Drawing on the logic of closeness from social network theory, I develop a theoretical account of when corporate managers can use the proximity afforded by their personal ties to decisionmakers to directly influence national security decision-making. I explain how they do so: educating decisionmakers on foreign policy challenges, mobilizing decisionmakers to defend the company’s interests from criticism, and building trust in their motives for pursuing a particular policy. Focusing on social networks has significant implications for our understanding of corporate power and national security, and yields different insights than an electoral politics model, in which the intensity of lobbying, the size of campaign contributions, and degree of business unity determine a corporation’s influence. Lobbying without direct ties to key decision-makers is unlikely to bear results, even for well-resourced corporations.

This paper explores these dynamics through the origins of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership. Leveraging within-case variation and original archival research of the lend-lease decision between 1941 and 1943, I argue that the social ties between the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) and the Roosevelt Administration shaped America’s security interest in Saudi Arabia. Only after institutional reforms in 1942 placed two CASOC managers in the administration, was the company able to use its proximity to the decision-making process to secure a long-term U.S. presence that would protect its investments in the kingdom. The conclusion considers implications for larger debates about economic actors and international security as well as for democratic accountability in U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

Author

• Miles Evers, George Washington University