Ruling Without Governing Isn't So Easy: Institutional Roots of Populism

• In Event: Populism in Comparative-Historical Perspective

Abstract

Incumbent elites routinely use constitutional design to try to secure their policy objectives before handing power over to elected politicians during transitions to democracy. These elite-biased institutions produce inequality, but whether, and under what conditions, these arrangements produce populist backlashes and democratic backsliding is unclear. This paper will lay out a theory of elite institutional choice, arguing that extant theories of how elites “game democracy” overlook reasons why elites might want to empower elected civilian leaders, particularly through majoritarian electoral rules. Then, using a comparative historical analysis of elite-biased institutions and populist backlashes in Turkey and Thailand, the paper will demonstrate that the combination of restrictive electoral rules and constitutional checks on the power of elected leaders creates a favorable opportunity structure for the emergence of populist parties. When countermajoritarian institutions are imposed by outgoing elites, attacking those institutions becomes a way for populists to cement their coalition by creating an “us versus them” dynamic. Although the exact nature of the cleavage structure is different in these societies and their levels of economic development vary, the combination of restrictive electoral rules and elite-imposed checks on elected politicians produced conflict between populist leaders and incumbent state elites, leading to the breakdown of democracy. These findings suggest an overlooked institutional cause of populism.

Author

• Geoffrey Landor Gordon, University of Virginia