Institutions and the Generation and Adjudication of Post-Election Disputes

• In Event: Electoral Fraud and Integrity

Abstract

Elections frequently lead to conflict and countries use a wide array of institutional strategies to mediate these disputes, but is this institutional variation systematically related to electoral integrity? In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the type of institution used to adjudicate electoral disputes, i.e. whether complaints are first heard by a court, the relevant election management body, the legislature, or some other body, the accessibility of the institution, and electoral integrity.

Since elections are ideally consequential for the distribution of political power, it is unsurprising that they frequently engender disputes. These complaints range from relatively minor administrative concerns, such as problems with absentee balloting and voter registration, to more pressing concerns, such as large-scale issues with improperly counted votes, large numbers of fraudulent ballots, and the intimidation of opposition candidates and voters. If these types of concerns go unaddressed for long enough, public confidence in elections is likely to decline and more serious electoral conflicts can arise, neither of which are associated with high-quality elections. Election monitoring and dispute resolution is therefore an important aspect of electoral integrity broadly.

While much work has been done on the role of international monitors in promoting electoral integrity, the role of domestic monitoring institutions has been relatively unexplored. Drawing on data from the International IDEA, I develop a Bayesian Item Response Theory model that quantifies the accessibility of dispute institutions according to specific design attributes, such as whether a fee is required to file a complaint and who has standing to make a complaint, across a broad range of countries. I then use the results of this model in several regression analyses that investigate the relationship between the accessibility of dispute institutions, as well as other important institutional attributes, and the integrity of the dispute process, using data from the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Survey. I find significant differences between different modes of institutional design and the prevalence of disputes and the likelihood that these disputes are resolved legally.

Author

• Joe Klaver, University of Michigan