Term Limits and Prosecutor Behavior: Evidence from Colorado”

• In Event: Justice and Injustice: Political Science Perspectives on Crime and Punishment Mini-Conference: The Electoral Connection: Democratic Control of Criminal Justice Elites

Abstract

While judges are consistently shown to behave more punitively when electoral incentives are
salient, most criminal punishment in the US is decided by local prosecutors in plea deals. Do
electoral incentives also lead prosecutors to pursue harsher penalties? We study a unique reform
in the state of Colorado, which unexpectedly imposed term limits on its 22 local district attorneys
in the 1990s. Using rich caselevel
data between 2000 and 2016, we test whether the imposition
of term limits led to changes in sentencing behavior via a lessening of the electoral incentive. We
also explore any changes in prosecutor behavior due to changes in competence.

Authors

• Michael Sances, University of Memphis

• Emily Kate Fulmer, University of Memphis