The Popular Logic of Authoritarian Policymaking: Blame and Attribution in Russia

• In Event: Blame and Accountability in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Can authoritarian regimes effectively rely on policy processes to generate popular support and shape political participation? In doing so, are they able to strategically distribute blame and credit for policies across different regime actors? Existing work posits a number of logics for authoritarian policymaking, ranging from a clientalistic desire to foster dependence on state largess to a desire to create “consultative accountability” and demonstrate attentiveness to popular needs. While this literature suggests that the effects of policymaking on popular opinion may vary based on the instigators and implementers of policies, less work has been done to understand whether and why individuals assign credit or blame to politicians at different levels of government. In this paper, we develop a model of blame/credit attribution in which the willingness of individuals to distinguish between different regime actors depends crucially on the extent to which policy has personal costs or benefits. Where individuals are directly affected, they are much more likely to distinguish between regime actors that made different policy proposals or who stepped in to address popular concerns. Where they are less directly affected, blame or attribution tends to correlate across regime actors. To test this model, we take advantage of a recent housing renovation program in Moscow (Russia) aimed at replacing aging Stalin-era buildings, in which residents of eligible buildings were relocated to new apartments. The policy was contentious, resulting in numerous revisions to accommodate public complaints. Using extensive archival work and interviews, we begin by documenting variation in the nature of policy proposals made by politicians at different levels of the Russian government (including federal officials), as well as subsequent suggested modifications. We then explore whether this variation is reflected in how participation shapes popular support for actors at different levels of the regime using an original survey of 2000 Muscovites. We exploit a quasi-natural experiment in assignment of buildings to the program in order to compare direct beneficiaries to bystanders in otherwise similar, nearby buildings that were not included. We then compare these groups to a representative sample of Muscovites to show the generality of our results. Our findings provide important insights into the logic of authoritarian policymaking and blame attribution. These have important implications for scholars of regime survival, public opinion, and collective action in non-democratic regimes.

Authors

• Ekaterina Borisova, National Research University Higher School of Economics

• Israel Marques, National Research University - Higher School of Economics

• Regina A. Smyth, Indiana University

• Alexei V Zakharov, Higher School of Economics