Electoral Institutions and Distributive Goods: Evidence from the CVRA

• In Event: Protecting Voting Rights in Redistricting and at the Ballot Box: Past and Future

Abstract

How does the aggregation of voters affect the equitable distribution of goods? We ask whether district elections for school boards amplify the interests of previously underrepresented groups, allowing them to collect a greater share of the centrally distributed goods. We leverage the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 as a conditionally exogenous institutional reform, compelling over one hundred school districts in California to switch from multi-member (`at-large') to single-member (`district') elections for school boards members. Using panel data, we measure a) whether district representation increases the funding of minority schools compared to their white counterparts within the same district and b) whether the reform causes a stronger relationship between spending and student need compared to one-size-fits-all approaches.

Authors

• Asya Magazinnik, MIT

• Michael Hankinson, George Washington University