Programmatic Clientelism and Development Outcomes in Rural Mexico

• In Event: Clientelist Politics and Development

Abstract

Political clientelism has characterised Latin American redistributive politics since the introduction of electoral systems in the early 20th Century. Mexico’s PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), which exercised its one-party rule from 1929 to 2000, was the archetypal clientelistic regime. While a large literature explores clientelism, there is scant but growing literature that highlights the coexistence of clientelism and programmatic policy. Drawing on the Mexican case, this study develops a theoretical framework that provides a rationalisation for the conditions in which clientelism can coexist with programmatic politics. The framework highlights i) the role of information externalities and brokers’ agency in signalling commitment to campaign promises, ii) voters’ risk aversion and ex-ante rational expectations in contexts of material deprivation, and iii) the effects that these interactions can have on development outcomes among the poor. The authors argue that while the relationship between incumbents and voters is asymmetric, it is still bidirectional, forcing incumbents, especially in increasingly more competitive electoral systems, to delivery campaign promises that can materialise in development outcomes.

In order to empirically test the theoretical framework, the study focuses on a natural experiment—Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera (POP) programme—and the additional public investment on health and education that immediately followed, to test empirically the propositions underpinning our theoretical framework. The authors exploit both POP’s exogenous poverty targeting criteria in rural areas; the gradual roll-out of the programme and the associated additional public expenditure on health and education at locality level; the variation in party campaign expenses in radio and tv adds, and the proximity of local branches of main political parties to POP’s treatment and control localities, for the identification of information externalities and political broker’s agency effects on development outcomes of the poor covering three presidential elections in the period 2000-2012.

Authors

• Miguel Nino-Zarazua, United Nations University

• Dragan Branimir Filipovich