The Contradictory Potential of Accountability Institutions in Latin America

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

It is widely believed that the stability of democracies—and even their survival—requires institutional mechanisms that hold those in power accountable for their performance. This belief is particularly strong in Latin American countries, where democratic deficits are often blamed on the weakness of the institutions that oversee the exercise of power from within the state (horizontal accountability) or from outside of it (vertical accountability). Yet in recent years, observers have noted that mechanisms for holding politicians accountable, from impeachment processes to anti-corruption investigations and even elections, have had ambiguous or outright negative effects on the quality of democracy.

This panel interrogates the conditions under which accountability institutions effectively support democratic stability and responsiveness in Latin America. To explain why corrupt politicians are able to win elections, Sofía Vera Rojas highlights a crucial condition for the functioning of electoral accountability in Peru: the availability of clear alternatives among candidates running for local office. Martín Ordóñez asks why municipal councils in Chile often fail to check mayors’ exercise of power. He argues that when council members are unable to generate and maintain their own base of support among constituents, local executives can use their resources and influence to reduce or increase council members’ electoral chances. Further investigating horizontal accountability, Will Freeman and Juan Diego Prieto address the contradictory potential of local anti-corruption institutions in Colombia. They build a theory to explain how corrupt local elites use the country’s decentralized accountability institutions to carry out partisan investigations against historically excluded political outsiders. Milena Ang studies the consequences of corruption prosecutions on political parties: drawing on original data of prosecution of Mexican governors, she argues that local executives that enjoy widespread electoral support will be better able to control their partisans in the federal legislature even after being prosecuted for criminal behavior.

Sub Unit

• Related Groups / Comparative Latin American Politics and Political Economy

Cosponsor

• Division 12: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries

Individual Presentations

• Clarity of Alternatives and Corruption Voting - Sofia B. Vera, University of Kansas

• Restraining Mayors: Local Councils as Agents of Horizontal Accountability - Martin Ordonez, UC Santa Cruz

• Prosecuting Pluralism: Local Accountability and Political Outsiders in Colombia - Will Garrett Freeman, Princeton University; Juan Diego Prieto Sanabria, Carleton College

• Losing Control: Corruption Prosecution and its Effects on Legislative Behavior - Milena Ang Collan Granillo, UT - San Antonio

Chair

• Miguel R. Rueda Emory University

Discussant

• Peter G. Johannessen University of Virginia