A Madisonian Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform by Michael J. Malbin

Session Submission Type: Author meet critics

Session Description

This “Author Meets Critics” panel is intended to give scholars of varying perspectives an opportunity to reflect and comment on campaign finance reform from a vantage point that connects the subject to some of the major political theory themes underlying constitutional democracy in the United States.

The paper to be used as a conversation starter is Michael J. Malbin’s “Madisonian Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform.” The paper begins with an overview of the ends or purposes commonly put forward in popular and scholarly discussions about campaign finance reform. Without debating either the merits of those ends, or whether specific reforms advocated to achieve them in fact will do so, the essay notes that almost none gives primacy to the goal of enhancing the performance of representative legislatures, the proper functioning of which is essential for constitutional democracy. To counterbalance this relative silence, the essay puts forward an alternative lens that it labels as neo-Madisonian. This perspective is closely related to an approach political scientists would describe as neo-institutionalist. An institutional or neo-institutional approach is one that sees rules and norms structuring both the way politicians gain office and the flow of decision-making within office. They are seen as forces channeling the behavior of office holders along with certain aspects of the policies they produce. The approach will be called neo-Madisonian because it begins from the self-described “new political science” perspective that Madison and his colleagues put forward around the time of the Constitution’s framing. Specifically, Madison and his colleagues wanted to create a legislative branch whose members felt an incentive to deliberate, bargain and compromise on the way toward forming governing majorities out of a purposely complex multiplicity of factions. Among other things, this essay will argue for the importance of maintaining an eye on this goal, whatever else one may be trying to accomplish.

However, the approach is called neo-Madisonian because of two major departures. The first involves a discussion of political parties in contemporary politics; the second is about correcting a flaw. With respect to political parties, the essay – like Madison himself in the 1790s – recognizes that the government’s formal institutions had to be supplemented by parties to fill out the original design. In this respect, the essay shares much with modern party scholars who criticize some reformers’ inattention or even hostility to the role parties can play. However, the essay parts company with many of these scholars over the vision of the parties put forward. Many modern party scholars argue for strengthening national party organizations. The paper argues that the strong local and state parties of the nineteenth and early twentieth century did in fact help support Madisonian goals, but that the polarized and nationalized parties of today are helping to undermine them. For that reason, the essay argues in favor of a reform approach that gently tries to counterbalance nationalized factions, interest groups, and national party leaders in Congress, by strengthening local political parties, and strengthening the ties between representatives and their geographic constituents.

Finally, the essay argues that precisely because of the Madisonian framework’s positive qualities, it is important to acknowledge and work toward correcting one problem the large republic has helped to exacerbate. The system is designed to promote bargaining and compromise by encouraging a multiplicity of factions. While complexity does serve to make majority tyranny more difficult, it also makes it harder for some citizens to be heard at all. The paper therefore argues that accepting the benefits of pluralism should come together with an obligation to address the major flaw associated with its biases. Specifically, it argues that this means fostering mechanisms that will give citizens a better opportunity to participate, and give candidates a stronger incentive to engage them in doing so. The essay ends, therefore, with a discussion of various forms of public campaign financing incentives that aim at accomplishing this, including recent critiques of the role of small donors.

Sub Unit

• Related Groups / Campaign Finance Research Group

Chairs

• Diana Dwyre California State University, Chico

• Robin A. Kolodny Temple University

Presenters

• Michael J. Malbin University at Albany, SUNY

• Thomas E. Mann University of California, Berkeley

• Paul S. Herrnson University of Connecticut

• Lynda W. Powell University of Rochester

• Nathaniel Persily Stanford University