Formal Models of International Conflict

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The papers on this panel develop formal models to study related topics in international conflict. Smith argues that arms transfers may result in peace by serving as a substitute for shaky alliance commitments. Reich models diplomatic negotiations as a war of attrition to study how states’ private information structure negotiations and explain variation in the timing of wars. Di Lonardo, Sun, and Tyson develop a model of humanitarian intervention to stop repression, which may be used by an autocrat to eliminate domestic challenges and ensure regime stability. Joseph develops a formal model of repeated crises where a Challenger’s decision to fight can either signal resolve or aggressive long-term intentions.

Sub Unit

• Division 4: Formal Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• Core Interest, Crisis Behavior, Reputation - Michael Frederick Joseph, George Washington University

• Humanitarian's Dilemma - Livio Di Lonardo, Bocconi University; Jessica Sun, Emory University; Scott Tyson, University of Rochester

• Arms Transfers and the Dynamics of Intervention - Bradley C Smith, Vanderbilt University

• Sinking (Audience) Costs - Noam Reich, Princeton University

Chair

• Kristopher W. Ramsay Princeton University

Discussants

• Alexandre Debs Yale University

• Avidit R. Acharya Stanford University