Electoral Volatility in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

• In Event: Elections Under Autocracy

Abstract

The ability of rulers to control the party system is key to the effective institutionalization of competitive authoritarian (CA) regimes. We explore the ability of CA incumbents to control the entry and exit of political parties and their ability to garner support through the first comprehensive assessment electoral volatility in a large sample of competitive authoritarian regimes. We hypothesize that the stability of electoral authoritarian regimes hinges on their ability to control the party system environment so that the support for the ruling coalition remains stable, while the opposition is institutionally disorganized hampering its ability to build a consistent and large constituency. To test this proposition we measure two new varieties of electoral volatility specific to CA regimes –ruling coalition volatility (RCV) and opposition volatility (OV). We hypothesize that stability in RCV and change in OV should promote CA regime stability.

Authors

• Michael Bernhard, University of Florida

• Allen D. Hicken, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

• Wooseok Kim, University of Michigan