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We develop a theoretical framework to show how communal violence in India, which is frequently tied to elections, can be controlled. Drawing on 52 interviews and archival evidence from a city in north India that experienced one of the worst riots in the country’s post-independence history in 1989 but has avoided the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim conflict since then, we find that communal violence can be controlled when state actors are able to draw the leaders of existing civil society groups into ongoing cooperation with the state. By comparing incidents that could have turned into riots—but ultimately did not—with a major case of communal carnage in the same city, we show that violence has been controlled through a system in which the state selects certain civil society leaders to receive privileged access to the state. This privileged access allows civil society leaders to resolve logistical problems for their constituents, cementing their status in their communities, and giving them authority and credibility to calm events during moments of tension. We use this empirical case to shed light on governance strategies where state actors delegate to non-state groups the performance of important state functions, as well as the specific tactics through which actors can prevent communal violence.